Contemporary end-servers and network-routers rely on traffic shaping to deal with server overload and network congestion. Although such traffic shaping provides a means to mitigate the effects of server overload and network congestion, the lack of cooperation between end-servers and networkrouters results in waste of network resources. To remedy this problem, we design, implement, and evaluate NetDraino, a novel mechanism that extends the existing queue-management schemes at routers to exploit the link congestion information at downstream end-servers. Specifically, NetDraino distributes the servers' traffic-shaping rules to the congested routers. The routers can then selectively discard those packets-as early as possible-that overloaded downstream servers will eventually drop, thus saving network resources for forwarding in-transit packets destined for non-overloaded servers. The functionality necessary for servers to distribute these filtering rules to routers is implemented within the Linux iptables and iproute2 architectures. Both of our simulation and experimentation results show that NetDraino significantly improves the overall network throughput with minimal overhead.
INTRODUCTION
The rapidly growing number of Internet users and services place increasing demands on web servers and network links, making it possible to overload end-servers and congest network links. Unfortunately, several recent Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and flash crowds on popular servers have shown that the current Internet architecture lacks a configurable mechanism for overload protection. Sudden loadsurges can easily overload the servers, which may, in turn, lead to denial of service or loss of data. They can also easily congest network links, and all flows that run R0 R1 S0 S1 S2 S3 servers clients through the congested links will suffer significant delays or losses. Simple active queue management such as BLUE [Feng et al. 2002] , Drop-Tail and RED [Floyd and Jacobson 1993] , can handle link congestion by dropping packets in the core of the Internet. However, these mechanisms do not differentiate among different flows/packets, and therefore, there is no way to selectively suppress high-bandwidth and/or low-priority traffic.
A popular configurable approach to mitigating the effect of congestion is to use traffic shaping in either network-routers or end-servers. Traffic shaping enforces prioritization of the transmission/reception of data over a network link. Typically, it associates packets with their traffic classes and regulates the incoming and/or outgoing rate of each traffic class as specified by the traffic-shaping rules. With traffic shaping, routers and servers can distinguish between the individual flows'/aggregates' Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and protect themselves from overload. For example, a web server can be configured to discard the requests from non-preferred customers to keep the total incoming request rate within the server's capacity limit.
QGuard [Jamjoom and Reumann 2000 ] is one such architecture that exploits the power of traffic shaping to provide overload protection and service differentiation at an end-server. It monitors the server's load and dynamically sets up a rate control to accept as much traffic as possible without overloading the server. QoS differentiation is achieved by allowing a higher incoming rate for higher-priority traffic. While simple iptables [Andreasson 2001 ] in the Linux firewall system can also provide server overload protection with QoS differentiation, QGuard 's adaptation mechanism maximizes server utilization. Unfortunately, neither QGuard nor iptables helps reduce network link congestion, as packets are dropped only after they are delivered to the end-server at the very edge of the network. Packets that the end-server will eventually drop as a result of its traffic shaping have already consumed network resources on their way to the end-server, possibly causing the dropping of other packets destined for non-overloaded servers. Let us consider the network shown in Figure 1 where a sudden surge of requests toward the endserver S 0 has congested the network link L 1 . S 0 can provide QoS differentiation to incoming requests by its own traffic shaping, but the active queue-management mechanism at the congested link L 1 will indiscriminately discard packets destined for the other end-servers S 1 , S 2 and S 3 .
To remedy this problem, the router R 0 should shape only the traffic destined for S 0 . Committed Access Rate (CAR) [Inc. 1998 ] and Traffic Control (TC) [Almesberger 1998 ] tools are such traffic-shaping features provided by Cisco and Linux routers, respectively. While the network administrator can use these features to set up the routers' rate controls, the routers cannot 'sense' their downstream servers' conditions in real time. Consequently, they might erroneously (i) drop packets destined for lightly-loaded servers and/or (ii) forward more requests to alreadyoverloaded servers.
To combat the above problem, we design, implement, and evaluate NetDraino, a novel mechanism that allows a server to inform its upstream routers of its congestion status. Routers can then use this information to decide on packet drops. In the above example, R 0 equipped with NetDraino becomes aware of S 0 's actual acceptance rate and allows only that rate of traffic toward S 0 to traverse L 1 , thus making more bandwidth available for forwarding traffic toward lightly-loaded servers S 1 , S 2 and S 3 . The main goal of NetDraino is to selectively discard those packets-as early as possible in the network (before they reach the servers)-that the overloaded servers will eventually drop. Not only NetDraino can relieve S 0 from the burden of dropping excess packets, but, more importantly, it can also minimize possible service degradation that S 1 , S 2 and S 3 may suffer. As a prototype to realize this goal, we apply the server-side NetDraino to the Linux 2.4 kernel's iptables firewalling system and use Linux routers with the iproute2 's traffic control (TC) to implement the router-side NetDraino.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of load-shedding mechanisms, highlighting the key features of NetDraino. Section 3 places NetDraino in a comparative context with related work. Section 4 details the design of NetDraino. Using the ns simulator [UCB/LBNL/VINT 2000], Section 5 evaluates the performance of NetDraino. Section 6 summarizes the implementation of a NetDraino prototype and Section 7 uses the implemented prototype to experimentally evaluate the benefits as well as the overhead of NetDraino. Finally, the paper concludes with Section 8.
OVERVIEW
Network links can be persistently overloaded for several reasons [Mahajan et al. 2001] . Links can be congested by ill-behaved flows, which do not conform to end-to-end congestion control. By a "flow," we mean a stream of packets identified/specified with its end-point attributes such as source and destination IP addresses, protocol field, and port numbers. To handle the link congestion caused by such ill-behaved flows, traffic-shaping schemes should schedule packets on a perflow basis. Obviously, a router equipped with flow-based congestion control must maintain state for each flow, making such a scheme unscalable in the core network.
Another traffic type that may congest links is a high-bandwidth traffic class (or an aggregate) that can be formed, for example, by flash crowds or distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, both of which are the main target of NetDraino. By "traffic class (aggregate)," we mean a set of flows with common properties, such as the same destination IP address and port. This notion of traffic class is commonly used in policy specifications for firewalls and was initially proposed in [Mogul et al. 1987] . In NetDraino, traffic-shaping rules at servers specify how to regulate high-bandwidth or low-priority traffic classes. For example, a rule specifying <destination address: 11.1.1.2, destination port: 80, protocol: TCP> defines a traffic class. If there is a large amount of traffic belonging to this class, it will be identified as a highbandwidth traffic aggregate and then regulated at routers. Note that whether the traffic is malicious (i.e., DDoS) or not (i.e., flash crowds) does not matter to the network; either case generates high-bandwidth traffic aggregates that can be identified by traffic-shaping rules at target servers. Jamjoom [Jamjoom and Shin 2003] has shown that the high-bandwidth traffic aggregates in the forward path can cause link overload. The scheme in NetDraino attempts to mitigate the effect of such link congestion to protect the flows on the overloaded links without compromising the aggregate's target.
Naive Load-Shedding
We first consider an intuitive (naive) load-shedding mechanism and identify its limitations. Suppose that servers are protected by QGuard [Jamjoom and Reumann 2000] . To discard excessive packets before they reach an overloaded server, the server may distribute the QGuard rules of the currently-configured filter to its upstream routers. The rules propagate to all routers within N hops of the server, where N is a design parameter. A router receiving the rules classifies packets and regulates their incoming rate according to these rules. Consider the network in Figure 2 . The thick lines in the figure represent heavy packet flows towards S 1 . The overloaded server S 1 activates/triggers a filter that consists of the three rules shown in the figure. Suppose that S 1 decides to distribute a rule that limits the incoming rate of traffic class <* → 11.1.1.1:80, TCP>, to routers R 1 and R 2 . Upon receiving the rule, R 1 and R 2 decide whether to install it, based on their links' load conditions. Suppose that R 2 installs the rule, then the traffic rate from R 2 to S 1 identified by the rule <* → 11.1.1.1:80, TCP> will be limited by the rate specified in the rule distributed by S 1 . R 1 and R 2 further distribute the rule to R 3 , R 4 , and R 5 . Suppose that the rule was accepted by both R 4 and R 5 . When R 4 and R 5 begin to shape the traffic according to this rule, the corresponding traffic from R 4 to R 2 and from R 5 to R 2 is regulated. As a result, traffic towards the lightly-loaded server, S 2 , will have a greater chance of reaching S 2 without being dropped in the network. The rule will propagate further to upstream routers of R 3 , R 4 , and R 5 , until it reaches routers located N hops away from S 1 .
Note that QGuard rules are distributed from a server to all of its upstream routers. This is obviously inefficient. In order to achieve wide routers' participation, N might have to be large, which can increase the number of a router's downstream servers flooding their rules to the router. When a router has a large number of upstream routers directly connected to it, the rule distribution would be very expensive. Moreover, the mechanism assumes that all the routers participate in adopting and propagating rules; a single non-conformant router can interfere with the entire set of desirable operations.
In the example network of Figure 2 , one may suggest lighter-weight rule propagation since S 1 only needs to distribute the rule to R 2 (because the link L 1 from R 1 to S 1 is not congested). Unfortunately, this choice would limit R 3 's ability to selectively drop packets. This is disadvantageous to R 3 when the link L 2 from R 3 to R 1 is congested by the flow <* → 11.1.1.1:80, TCP>. Even though L 1 is not congested, L 2 can be congested by the flow because the capacity of L 2 may be lower than L 1 . We, therefore, need a more intelligent mechanism that allows all compliant routers to participate in the load-shedding protocol.
Sketch of NetDraino
NetDraino allows an end-server to distribute its traffic-shaping rules to its upstream network-routers. For scalability, not only the rules should be distributed efficiently, but also they should not over-burden the routers in installing them. A router cannot accommodate all the rules from all of its downstream servers since it may consume most of its resources just to match each packet against the many filters installed on it. The router should, therefore, install only those rules that may significantly lighten its link congestion condition. Furthermore, since the congestion condition varies with time, the routers' rule sets must also be adapted dynamically.
In NetDraino, a congested router informs its downstream end-servers of its IP address. Specifically, the congested router first advertises its congestion condition by marking the packets going through the congested link. If an end-server receiving the router congestion notification happens to be overloaded, it replies back by marking its outgoing packets so that the congested router can be informed of the congested server. Then, the congested router can append its IP address to the packets destined for the overloaded servers. This way, a server learns of the IP addresses of congested routers, and hence, can directly distribute the rules only to those routers which are congested, instead of distributing rules indiscriminately to all of its upstream routers. Note that the server can customize the rules for the targete router so that they can effectively and correctly soothe congestion at the router. The routers regulate packets according to the rules they received from their downstream servers in order to lighten up their link congestion and cut down the requests toward the congested servers. To minimize the cost to dynamically adapt to varying network condition, NetDraino takes a soft-state approach to managing the rules distributed to each router; the rules must be refreshed within a certain timeout period, else they expire and hence will become invalid. NetDraino is more desirable than the intuitive scheme because only overloaded servers and congested routers need to classify and regulate packets, and communicate with each other.
While NetDraino handles link congestion by separating high-bandwidth traffic aggregates from other normal traffic, it is orthogonal to a traffic differentiation algorithm that identifies high-bandwidth aggregates at target servers: it assumes that traffic-shaping rules at the servers correctly reflect the prioritization policy for each traffic class, and resorts to the definitions in the policy or rules for identifying high-bandwidth aggregates. In this respect, NetDraino may complement end-hostbased schemes for mitigating DoS attacks [Lakshminarayanan et al. 2003; Yaar et al. 2004] . Note that the rules are not distributed when none of the congested server's upstream routers is overloaded. This avoids unnecessary deployment overhead, because none of the servers may suffer service degradation if their upstream routers are not congested. In this case, the server receiving the heavy traffic can easily protect itself with well-studied overload control schemes [Jamjoom and Reumann 2000; Iyer et al. 2000; Andreasson 2001; Welsh and Culler 2003 ].
RELATED WORK
NetDraino combines traffic shaping at servers with packet scheduling and preferential dropping at routers. Specifically, the routers in NetDraino enforce an anticipatory flow control back-pressed by traffic shapers at severs. In this section, we first discuss the related work that prevents congestion and overload of severs and routers. Then, we briefly review the work that also uses a back-pressure control scheme in a distributed system, stressing the distinct features of NetDraino.
Traffic regulation at servers was usually studied as a part of QoS management solutions for Internet severs. These solutions allow the network administrators to specify a traffic-shaping policy, which defines rate limits for different traffic classes. For example, Linux iptables [Andreasson 2001] and Extreme Network's ExtremeWare [Inc. 2002] provide an interface to specify traffic classifiers and associated rate limits. These approaches are based on static rate control; their traffic-shaping policy cannot be integrated with the current overload status of Internet servers, without intervention of administrators. To maximize server utilization, APF s [Reumann et al. 2001] in QGuard [Jamjoom and Reumann 2000 ] allow administrators to define dynamic overload responses for their systems. Based on monitoring the input of an overload server, QGuard protects the Internet server dynamically with the least restrictive filter possible. While all these schemes protect servers from overload and provide a certain level of QoS differentiation, they have a common limitation of inbound rate controls; the earlier their traffic-shaping policy is enforced in the network, the better performance they may provide.
There are numerous studies on router scheduling mechanisms. While simple active queue management such as Drop-Tail and RED can handle link congestion by dropping excess packets, RED with ECN [Floyd 1994 ], RED variants [Feng et al. 1999; Ott et al. 1999] and BLUE [Feng et al. 2002] were proposed to improve the network performance in the presence of congestion. While these schemes alone cannot differentiate packets with various priorities, per-flow scheduling mechanisms and their variants such as Fair Queueing [Demers et al. 1989 ] and Core-Stateless Fair Queueing [Stoica et al. 1998 ] enable preferential dropping of packets with flow-based congestion control. Another approach to differentiating and rate-limiting packets is a class-based scheduling mechanism, which regulates the traffic aggregates based on traffic classifiers. Class-based scheduling mechanisms include CBQ [Floyd and Jacobson 1995] and Adaptive Packet Marking [Feng et al. 1997] , and NetDraino can be viewed as a descendant of these approaches. The contribution of NetDraino is to enable a router to have dynamic definitions of aggregates that cause congestion at its downstream severs, instead of fixed definitions specified by administrators.
NetDraino "pushes" traffic-shaping rules at servers-defined either statically or dynamically-into the network so that routers can regulate traffic aggregates before they reach the servers. This concept of back-pressure flow control can be found in literature. First, it dates back to Tymnet and X.25 [CCITT 1998b ] packet-switched networks with their hop-by-hop flow control. ATM networks also use the backpressure scheme for their flow control on VCs. In TCP/IP Internet, Iyer et al. [Iyer et al. 2000] argue that incoming traffic into a server had better be regulated early at the server's network interface card (NIC), or at the server's previous node (a proxy server), for effective overload control in servers. In a similar context, Welsh and Culler [Welsh and Culler 2003 ] use their staged event-driven architecture (SEDA) to apply admission control at as early stages as possible, based on the performance of back stages. These control schemes are to minimize the server's work spent on a request which is eventually not serviced due to overload. On the other hand, NetDraino tries to minimize the network resources consumed for such a request, and is orthogonal to the schemes mentioned above; NetDraino may seamlessly combine with the existing overload control schemes at servers.
Lakshminarayanan et al. [Lakshminarayanan et al. 2003 ] take the same view of NetDraino to propose that end-hosts be responsible for defining traffic filters and pushing them back into the network. But their approach still focuses on protecting the target hosts, thus inserting filters at the last hop router only instead of propagating them far into the network. Pushback [Ioannidis and Bellovin 2002] , a mechanism for defending against DDoS attacks, has an approach similar to NetDraino, in that routers dynamically adopt and propogate traffic-shaping rules, which identify aggregates and specify rate limits. But their definitions of aggregates do not reflect the condition of servers, and the rules should be propagated router-by-router. Persistent dropping (PD) [Jamjoom and Shin 2003 ] takes into account the effects of client persistence on the controllability of aggregate traffic. PD complements the existing traffic-shaping solutions by controlling the reaction of the underlying traffic to a rate-limiting policy, and NetDraino will also benefit from PD. 
NETDRAINO
This section details the design of NetDraino. Specifically, Sections 4.1 through 4.4 describe the steps taken in NetDraino to accomplish the cooperation between routers and servers as outlined in Section 2.2. Figure 3 depicts a simplified pictorial example of how NetDraino works in each step. The first two steps are to let congested servers know the IP addresses of the congested routers, and prepare the traffic-shaping rules to be distributed to the congested routers. The last two steps perform actual traffic regulation at the congested routers, and maintain the rules distributed to each congested router.
Determination of Router Congestion and Communication of Server Congestion to Routers
Before informing servers of its IP address, a congested router should first learn of congested servers. NetDraino uses two ToS bits in the IP packet header for this purpose. As shown in Figure 4 , NetDraino uses one of ToS bits to indicate router congestion and the other to indicate server congestion. Note that if there is no congested server at all, thus no hint on downstream servers' overload conditions, the router cannot take advantage of NetDraino. Instead, it can resort to its own AQM policy [Floyd 1994; Floyd and Jacobson 1995; Feng et al. 2002; Jamjoom and Shin 2003 ] to quench congestion. But fortunately, the very natures of traffic aggregates such as flash crowds or DoS attacks suggest that there exist conngested servers corresponding to the traffics causing router congestion. As in RED, a router equipped with NetDraino calculates the average queue length using the exponentially-weighted moving average. This average queue length is compared to a threshold th congest , a design parameter, that NetDraino uses to determine if the router is congested. When the average queue length is greater than th congest , every arriving packet is randomly marked with the Router-CongestionNotification (RCN) bit set to 1. Thus, packets with RCN bit=1 indicate that they traversed at least one congested router. Random marking of packets in this step is to reduce the chance of marking packets that are not part of heavy traffic.
When a server equipped with a traffic rate limiter receives a packet with RCN bit=1, it checks if the marked packet constitutes excess traffic to the server, i.e., the server is overloaded. If yes, it sets the Server-Congestion-Notification (SCN) bit in the header of its outgoing packets with the destination equal to the source of each marked packet. When a congested router receives the packets with SCN bit=1, it knows which servers are congested and may begin to notify the servers of its IP address as described in Section 4.2. Note that, in this scenario, the congested router should reside both in the forward and reverse paths between the client and the server. This is a reasonable assumption within an AS. But, as AS path asymmetry is known to be common in the Internet, we may have to slightly modify the mechanism for NetDraino to be widely deployed by multiple ISPs. For example, in this extended scenario, a client, instead of a router, can be aware of the packets with SCN bit=1, and use an additional ToS bit to notify routers of server congestion. That is, it can mark the packets destined for the congested servers so that the routers along the packets' paths can be aware of the congested servers as well.
The router stores the IP addresses of thus-identified congested servers using a FIFO queue called CServs (Congested Servers) whose length is Q . Since the number of simultaneously-congested servers is expected to be small, Q is usually small. IP addresses in CServs age with time. If their age exceeds a pre-set limit, they will be removed to prevent the router from using obsolete servers congestion information. Since NetDraino adds to CServs the source (server) addresses of packets with SCN bit=1 whenever such packets arrive at a congested router, CServs may contain the server addresses for which the router's heavy traffic is not destined. While a mechanism for keeping the history of packets marked with RCN bit could be added to handle these false congested server addresses, such a situation would occur very rarely and hence we omitted it. Figure 5 router to identify congested servers.
Communication of Router Congestion to Servers
Once a congested router has identified congested servers, it appends its IP address to the IP option fields of packets destined for the servers in CServs so that it may receive hints as to which packets the servers will probably discard. We assume that all routers just forward, rather than drop, the packets with unknown IP options, though we do not require that all the routers be aware of NetDraino and participate in the mechanism. The servers receiving the packets with the NetDraino-filled IP option can identify the congested routers and collect & maintain statistics of how much of their traffic has gone through each congested router. The hints on packet drops are returned to the congested routers after they are tailored to the statistics collected by the servers. Because it is expensive to append additional data to a packet in flight, a router does not alter all in-transit packets. Instead, it modifies each candidate packet with some probability p a , one of NetDraino design parameters. Note that the traffic consuming more bandwidth is more likely to be modified, which is desirable because it is the high-bandwidth traffic that a congested
The algorithm for a server to distribute traffic-shaping rules.
router wants to limit. Figure 6 depicts the proposed algorithm. When packets arrive at the router's output queue, a traffic shaper polices them according to the installed traffic-shaping rules as described in Section 4.4. If the router is not congested or the outgoing packet is not destined for the servers in CServs, the router does not append its address. When it decides to modify the packet, some of its upstream routers might have already appended their addresses to the packet. Even then, it just adds its own address to the packet forming a list of router IP addresses. While allowing unlimited addition of information to a packet -though IPv4 allows addition of no more than 40 bytes for IP option fields -is usually a poor design choice, allowing addition of only one router address in a packet and disallowing modification of the already-modified packet will provide servers erroneous statistics. However, more than one IP address will rarely be appended to a packet since p a is usually very small. Our simulation results in Section 5.3 show that p a = 0.1 suffices to maintain correct statistics at servers, in which case the probability of appending multiple IP addresses to packets is less than 0.01.
Distributing Server's Traffic-Shaping Rules
For each policed traffic class tc i , a server maintains a list CR i of congested routers' IP addresses. CR i represents the congested routers that class tc i packets have traversed before reaching the server. Each entry in CR i associates with it the statistics of the traffic rate from the router represented by the entry. When a server receives a tc i -packet with a router's IP address, the packet is fed into the corresponding entry in CR i as a sample. If enough samples are collected in the entry, the filtering rules will be determined and then distributed.
The server should first allocate a rate limit for the router to which it forwards a shaping rule. Suppose that (i) a rule R i polices traffic class tc i by limiting its rate to rate i in the server; and (ii) the server determines to distribute R i to one of its upstream routers, router U . The server knows that the total incoming rate of tc i is total tci , and uses the statistics maintained in CR i to infer the fraction, f rom router U , of this traffic that comes from router U . Then, the ideal rate limit for router U would be somewhere between rate i * f rom router U /total tc i and rate i . It is very difficult to get an exact value for this rate limit since it depends on the actual traffic arrival process. We use k * f rom router U /total tc i as the fractional rate limit for router U , where k is an experimentally-determined scaling factor. After determining the rate limit for the congested router, the server distributes the tailored rule to the corresponding router. Figure 7 summarizes this algorithm.
Policing Packets
Once a router receives the rules from a server, it installs them and polices packets according to them. The received rules constitute the NetDraino traffic shaper shown in Figure 6 . The server does not maintain the rules once they are distributed. Instead, the router maintains the installed rules by itself. This minimizes the amount of state information each end-server needs to maintain, thus increasing the robustness of NetDraino; it can tolerate router or server failures without incurring any further overhead. Failed servers or routers will simply be "forgotten" via expiration of soft states by NetDraino.
The rules installed in each router remain valid only for δ seconds after which they time out. Suppose that a rule R i is to police traffic class tc i by limiting its rate to rate i in a router. By installing R i at time t 0 , the router could reduce its congestion. If it removes R i at t 0 + δ, its outgoing link can become heavily-overloaded by unregulated tc i traffic because the traffic might not yet have subsided. Instead of completely removing an expired rule, NetDraino gradually increases the rate limit specified in the rule. Let total rate i denote the rate limit for tc i in the server which distributed R i . NetDraino places several gradual rate limit steps between rate i and total rate i , which are incrementally adopted at every δ seconds by each installed rule in the router as it ages. While relaxing the rate limit, both the router and the server might become congested. In such a case, the mechanism restarts. The router will mark packets with its IP address and the congested servers will eventually send updated rules to the router. rate i is removed from the router either when its rate limit becomes higher than total rate i or when it becomes lightly-loaded.
SIMULATION
The performance of NetDraino under various configurations is evaluated using the ns simulator [UCB/LBNL/VINT 2000] for an example network with 25 clients and 5 servers as shown in Figure 8 . Each client requests multiple TCP and UDP connections to each server. Pareto ON/OFF sources with mean ON-time of 500 ms and mean OFF-time of 1000 ms were run to generate TCP traffic, and CBR sources were run to generate UDP traffic. In addition, all sources started transmission of 1-KB packets at a random time within the first 3 seconds of simulation. The routers were configured to store up to 30 packets in each output queue under a Figure 8 . The network topology used for simulation. RED queueing discipline modified to support NetDraino. Among servers, we made S 0 overloaded by making most of connection requests to S 0 . Each server adopted a simple packet filter that polices the rates of TCP and UDP traffic as shown in Figure 8 . It simulates iptables rather than QGuard since it does not adapt itself to the server's load. The default configurations in Table I were used for our simulation unless specified otherwise.
Incoming traffic rate at a congested server
To understand the behavior of NetDraino, Figures 9(a) and 9(b) compare the incoming traffic rates of the congested server S 0 in the example network with and without NetDraino. Both the rate of traffic arriving at the server and that of traffic accepted by the server are shown in each graph. The filters were distributed for the first time around t = 5.0 in the simulation. In Figure 9 (a), the overlap of two traffic rates after t = 5.0 shows that traffic to S 0 was regulated by upstream routers and few packets were rejected by S 0 , while the difference between two traffic rates in Figure 9 (b) shows that unregulated traffic to S 0 was filtered out at S 0 , wasting the resources to deliver packets which were dropped at S 0 . During the simulation the acceptance rate in Figure 9 (a) remained around 400 pkts/s, which was a total traffic rate limit specified by the filter of S 0 . This means that traffic was regulated properly; few packets were filtered out in the upstream routers of S 0 when S 0 could accept all of the packets.
Throughput
We now show the increase of network throughput by adopting the NetDraino's selective packet drop mechanism. By throughput, we mean the average number of packets per second that are accepted by each server. To consider the effect of traffic towards the congested server, the throughput was measured by increasing the number of TCP connections and the UDP sending rate of each client. The number of TCP connections was varied from 10 to 400 in increments of 10, while the UDP sending rate was varied from 0 KB/s to 78 KB/s in increments of 2KB/s. For readability, We provided only the number of TCP connections in the x-axis of the graph. Figure 10(a) shows the throughput measured from simulations with and without NetDraino, while Figure 10(b) shows the fractional throughput gain of NetDraino. The fractional throughput gain is the percentage increase in the throughput of the network with NetDraino, compared to that without NetDraino. In Figure 10 (a), the throughput of the network with NetDraino remains unchanged as the number of connections to S 0 increases over a certain point (around 40 TCP connections), while that without NetDraino decreases as more traffic is bound for S 0 . Since the congested links remain fully-utilized for both systems, the gap between the two represents the number of packets that waste the network resources without NetDraino. The gain of network throughput with NetDraino in Figure 10(b) is the result of the decreasing throughput without NetDraino. It shows that the throughput of the network with NetDraino is almost 90% higher than that without NetDraino when traffic bound for S 0 is the heaviest (400 TCP connections), at which point the ratio of traffic toward S 0 to other traffic is 10 to 1.
Note that the throughput gain keeps increasing as traffic bound for S 0 gets heavier. The throughput goes up to 1.27 and 1.38 when traffic to S 0 increases to 800 and 1200 TCP connections, respectively. Theoretically, it reaches its maximum when traffic to S 0 overwhelms other traffic, which is about 900 pkts/sec (the maximum bandwidth of network) 450 pkts/sec (the accepting rate of S 0 ) . 
Effects of design parameters
We now illustrate how the choice of NetDraino design parameters affects its performance. Each point in Figures 11(a) , 11(b) and 11(c) represents a different simulation, with different values for k , th congest and p a , respectively, where k is the scaling factor used by a server to allocate a rate limit for a congested router, and th congest is the threshold used by a router to decide if it is congested or not in the NetDraino semantics. Finally, p a is the probability for a congested router to append its IP address to the packets destined for the servers in CServs. The performance of NetDraino was evaluated in terms of the network throughput gain while varying these configuration parameters. To get a more general understanding of the effect, each configuration was tested under two situations: (i) each client generates 100 TCP connections to S 0 (default), and (ii) it doubles the traffic to S 0 .
Figure 11(a) shows that NetDraino's performance does not make any significant difference when k is varied from 1.0 to 2.0. This is surprising because we expected a lower gain with a small k around 1.0 as well as with a large k around 2.0. The low gain with a small k may be the result of 'false positives' where the filters distributed by S 0 over-limit the rate of traffic toward S 0 , causing the underutilization of S 0 . The low gain with a large k may result from the opposite situation; the distributed rules are too generous and too much of excess traffic is dropped at S 0 , wasting network resources. However, it turned out that the over-limiting rules distributed under a small k allow more traffic delivered to other servers than S 0 , compensating for the underutilization of S 0 . When a large k was used, the generous rules at the congested routers did drop some packets bound for servers other than S 0 in order to deliver the packets that S 0 would drop, but its effect was insignificant because the increased rate limit by the generous rules was insignificant compared to the entire traffic.
The results in Figure 11 (b) are related to the responsiveness of NetDraino; the smaller th congest , the earlier a router begins to set the RCN bit of its in-transit packets, and therefore, the better responsiveness. Figure 11(b) shows that there was no significant difference in the throughput gain when th congest ranges from 5 to 20, but it decreased if th congest was configured to be over 20. The burstiness of traffic yielded similar responsiveness to the case of th congest values ranging from 5 to 20, while the effects of slow responsiveness appeared in the simulations with th congest configured to be over 20. Figure 11(c) shows the effect of p a on NetDraino's performance. p a is closely related to NetDraino's overhead, because it is the most expensive in the mechanism for a router to append its IP address to in-transit packets. A smaller p a is needed to lower the overhead, but it may result in erroneous statistics to be maintained by servers. Fortunately, the simulation results show that a p a value as small as 0.1 suffices for NetDraino to perform well.
IMPLEMENTATION
The router-and server-side NetDraino prototypes are implemented as extension modules for the Linux 2.4 kernel's iproute2 framework and iptables firewalling system, respectively. Each router or server participating in the NetDraino mechanism loads the kernel module and runs a user-level daemon called ndagent which is responsible for communication between a router and a server. Specifically, ndagent in a server makes a TCP connection to ndagent in a router to distribute traffic-shaping rules. To pass information from the kernel modules to the co-hosted ndagent or vice versa, we chose to use the Linux Netlink socket [Dhandapani and Figure 12 . NetDraino architecture.
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. Figure 12 provides an abstract view of NetDraino architecture. The arrows in the figure represent the flow of traffic-shaping rules. The kernel in a server notifies the co-hosted ndagent of the rule tailored to the statistics it collects and maintains. Then, ndagent in the server sends the rule to ndagent in the target router over a TCP connection. We chose to use ASN.1 [CCITT 1998a ] to specify the rule for its flexibility. ndagent receiving the rule in the router requests the kernel to regulate the incoming traffic according to the rule.
While we use flexible Linux machines for prototype implementation, we argue that an implementation of the routing extension can scale as well on an alternative architecture such as a Cisco router. For example, as mentioned in Section 1, routers with Committed Access Rate (CAR) feature can already rate-limit traffic aggregates defined by user supplied rules. A router's manipulation of a packet's RCN bit is also a trivial task, considering that an Internet router must already decrement the TTL and recalculate the IP header checksum of every packet it forward. To store the list of congested servers and check if a packet is destined for any of them, the routing table structure can be slightly extended to set aside a room for additional fields. But, unfortunately, for the router's exchange of traffic shaping rules with end hosts, our simple ASN.1 protocol unit may have to be replaced with a more formal protocol, which can be an extension of SNMP.
Router-side NetDraino
For the router-side NetDraino implementation, we added a new queueing discipline, called ndfifo, to Linux 2.4 kernel's iproute2 framework. ndfifo extends the FIFO (drop-tail) queueing discipline module so that it can perform additional functions described in Section 4, while other queueing disciplines such as RED can also be easily extended to provide such functionalities. Figure 13 shows the architecture of the router-side NetDraino prototype. When ndfifo is loaded, it registers to listen to NF IP FORWARD hook in the Linux Netfilter architecture, at which it identifies packets with SCN bit set and updates the corresponding CServs list. The incoming traffic is regulated by the NetDraino rules when it is enqueued according to the ndfifo queueing discipline. We implemented ndfifo's dequeue function so that it can randomly append the router's IP address to a packet's IP option field if the packet is destined for a server in CServs. Figure 14 shows the format of the new IP option to deliver router's IP addresses. APPEND PROBABILITY and SEQUENCE NUMBER fields in the option are used by the destination server to maintain statistics as described in Section 6.2. The IP option can contain information of multiple routers, but the total length of IP options in IPv4 must not exceed 40 bytes. If ndfifo is unable to append the router's IP address due to the total length limit of IP options, it simply gives up on appending the information; it may cause inaccurate statistics at the server, but its effect would not be significant since such a situation occurs very rarely.
Server-side NetDraino
We have implemented a new match extension module, called ndlimit, for the Linux 2.4 kernel's iptables firewalling system. ndlimit extends the existing limit match extension that implements the well-known token bucket rate-control scheme, while slightly changing the original semantics. ndlimit assumes that the target of the match is limited to NF ACCEPT and unmatched packets should be dropped. These assumptions are valid, considering the fact that ndlimit is only to regulate the incoming traffic while the original match module is intended to provide more general functionalities such as limited logging of specific rules. In addition to traffic-shaping functionality, ndlimit maintains the statistics of excess traffic and handles the SCN- bit marking of packets. Figure 15 shows the architecture of server-side NetDraino prototype. It identifies packets with RCN bit set at NF IP LOCAL IN hook, and selectively marks the packets with SCN bit at NF IP POST ROUTING hook in the protocol stack. Each ndlimit match rules in the server maintains a list of congested routers' statistics as shown in the figure. Every incoming packet that is fed into a ndlimit match increments the count of total packets in the match. If the packet contains a router's information in its IP option field, it also increments the count of info packets in the corresponding router's entry. By info packets, we simply mean the packets carrying the congested routers' IP addresses. ndlimit estimates the number of packets that traversed the congested router as (# inf o pkts)/(append probability). If the estimation exceeds a pre-defined threshold, it notifies the agent daemon of the collected statistics to distribute the rule to the routers. Because there is no fixed time window to collect statistics, it may take a long time to distribute the rule if its info packets arrive at a slow rate. But this is reasonable because such traffic would not be very heavy and it is not urgent to deliver the shaping rule. Sequence numbers are used to prevent erroneous statistics. Suppose that a router R 0 starts randomly appending its IP address to packets destined for S 0 at time t 0 but stops it at t 1 . If R 0 restarts notifying S 0 of its IP address at t 2 , S 0 must notice the absence of this information between t 1 and t 2 . Otherwise, it will underestimate the number of packets traversed R 0 . For this purpose, the router assigns a new sequence number whenever it starts 'shipping' its IP address, and the server resets statistics and recollects it whenever it detects the change of the sequence number.
EVALUATION

Experimental Setup
To validate NetDraino in a more realistic environment, we conducted experiments on a testbed consisting of 4 routers and 2 servers (1 GHz Pentium III generic PCs with 256 MB memory and 100 Mbps Ethernet adapters, hosting Linux 2.4.19) as shown in Figure 16 , where R n are routers and S n are servers. To make the measurement easier, we lower the bandwidth of the link between the R 2 and R 3 to 2 Mbps, expecting R 2 to be easily overloaded in the presence of heavy transit traffic. We use class-based queue (CBQ) present in Linux 2.4 kernel's iproute2 framework to simulate the link with a low bandwidth, while our ndfifo kernel module serves as a queueing discipline of CBQ. Note that the topology consists of 3 layers. The first (leftmost) layer conceptually corresponds to WAN-to-MAN links, the second layer to MAN-to-LAN, and the last one to LAN-to-Host links. Each router is configured to store up to 50 packets in its outgoing queue. We performed two sets of experiments, where the traffic generation agents simulate either flash crowds or DoS attacks. In both sets of experiments, high-bandwidth traffic is bound for S 0 , while the other normal traffic heads for S 1 . In the first set of experiments with the flash crowds traffic, two traffic generation agents attached to R 0 and R 1 make requests to S 0 and S 1 ; 200 requests representing the background traffic towards S 1 are generated every second, while the number of requests to S 0 is varied to account for the aggressiveness of the flash crowds traffic. In the second set of experiments, the agents generate a massive number of 1KB UDP packets destined for S 0 (as well as normal traffic), mimicking DoS attacks to S 0 . Specifically, each agent generates 50 requests/sec to S 0 and S 1 , while varying the rate of UDP traffic towards S 0 as specified in each experiment. TCP and UDP requests' interarrival times are simply configured to be uniformly-distributed, because the effects of using other more realistic distribution (e.g., a Poisson-distribution) are trivial when the agent generates a very high rate of requests as in our experiments.
Each server adopts a traffic shaper that polices the rates of TCP SYN and UDP traffic as shown in Figure 16 . We use the Linux 2.4 kernel's iptables firewalling system with our ndlimit extension module to regulate the traffic at servers. While S 1 can accept all the incoming packets with this configuration, S 0 may drop some of them and thus simulate to be overloaded, depending on the request rates specified in each experiment. Table II shows the values of several NetDraino design parameters chosen in our experiments. These values are shown to be appropriate in Section 5
Basic Overhead
In NetDraino, appending the congested router's IP address to packets in the network and forwarding traffic-shaping rules from the congested servers may increase the network traffic, but the network bandwidth requirement for NetDraino is minimal. Under the testbed setup in Section 7.1, NetDraino can add at most 0.4% more network traffic as a result of appending the NetDraino-filled IP option to packets, which takes into account the possible packet segmentation. In addition, only one or two NetDraino control messages -which contain the traffic-shaping rules -are generated in a minute by a congested server.
To evaluate the overhead NetDraino incurs to a router, we collected the CPU time spent in each kernel function at R 2 during the experiments. For this purpose, we used kernprof [SGI 2003 ], a set of facilities for profiling the Linux kernel. NetDraino consumes the router's CPU time to (1) regulate the traffic according to the installed shaping rules, and (2) process each incoming packet to randomly append its IP address. To account for the first case overhead, we varied the number of rules installed at R 2 from 1 to 100 and let R 2 check each incoming packet against all those rules. The second case overhead was measured through the experiments described in the following subsections. The experimental results obtained in both cases show that the overhead of NetDraino is negligible: R 2 consumes less than 1% more CPU cycles when it has installed as many as 100 shaping rules than when it has installed none, and it consumes less than 2% more CPU cycles to randomly append its IP address to packets than when it does not use NetDraino.
Performance of NetDraino
NetDraino is designed to reduce network congestion by selective packet drops. A congested router will reduce its congestion intelligently to maximize network throughput. To validate the throughput gain by NetDraino, we performed two sets of experiments as described in Section 7.1, with and without NetDraino. As was done in Section 5.2, the throughput was measured by increasing TCP or UDP request rates towards S 0 by each traffic generation agent. In the first set of experiments with TCP only traffic, the total TCP request rate to S 0 was varied from 50 to 500 reqs/s in increments of 50 reqs/s. In the second set of experiments with UDP traffic overloading the links, the total UDP sending rate was varied from 0.4 Mbps to 4 Mbps in increments of 0.4 Mbps. In each experiment, throughput was measured over ten 120-second intervals and then averaged. They show the results similar to those obtained from the simulation in Section 5.2, demonstrating NetDraino's ability of improving the network throughput. In the first scenario, S 0 achieves the same throughput with and without NetDraino, limited by the accepting rate of S 0 (100 reqs/s), while S 1 enjoys the most benefit from NetDraino as expected. When there are 400 reqs/s towards S 0 , the network throughput with NetDraino is 30% higher than that without NetDraino. In the second scenario, both S 0 and S 1 get the same benefit from NetDraino. NetDraino throttles UDP traffic at R 2 , saving the link bandwidth between R 2 and R 3 for Web traffic. In the presence of 4 Mbps UDP traffic, the servers with NetDraino could accept 45% more requests than those without NetDraino. Though we have not performed additional experiments with more aggressive traffic towards S 0 , we expect that as the traffic to S 0 gets heavier, the network throughput without NetDraino continues to drop down to a certain point (the acceptance rate of S 0 in the first experiments set, and 0 in the second case), while that with NetDraino remains unchanged. One interesting result is that the total throughput with NetDraino also drops when the traffic toward S 0 increases. Because NetDraino incurs little overhead to routers, the responsiveness of NetDraino accounts for such a drop in the total throughput. With ideal responsiveness, traffic-shaping rules at S 0 should be forwarded to R 2 as soon as R 2 becomes congested, and should be enforced at R 2 as long as such congestion remains. But due to the distributed nature of NetDraino, R 2 is left unprotected from congestion for a short time, resulting in a slight service degradation at servers.
Note that S 0 may also save its resource used to handle the incoming packets, because NetDraino drops packets before they reach the servers. To evaluate the resource savings at S 0 , we collected the kernel profiles of S 0 during the experiments. The results show that NetDraino saves S 0 's CPU cycles used in the network kernel, but the savings is less than 1%. This small savings may be due to the fact that we limit the link bandwidth between R 2 and R 3 to 2 Mbps, and S 0 has only a single network interface accepting the traffic. If S 0 is configured to receive a massive amount of traffic, NetDraino may save much more CPU cycles of S 0 .
CONCLUSION
We have proposed, implemented and evaluated NetDraino, a new mechanism that links servers' traffic-regulation schemes to routers' queue management mechanisms, in order to maximize the network throughput. Specifically, NetDraino distributes servers' traffic-shaping rules to, and enforces them on, congested routers. It largely consists of four steps. First, a congested router identifies congested servers, and conversely, a congested server maintains a list of congested routers. Second, the congested router broadcasts its IP address using the NetDraino-filled IP option, while the congested server maintains the statistics showing the traffic rate from each congested router. Third, the congested server tailors its traffic-shaping rules to the target router based on the statistics, and directly distributes them to the router. Finally, each congested router can enforce the rules distributed to itself.
Our simulation and experimentation results have shown that NetDraino significantly improves the overall network throughput with minimal overhead. This benefit can be provided to all flows sharing the congested link, without burdening any specific hosts. More importantly, NetDraino can be easily deployed in, and is scalable to, a large network, because only those congested servers and routers need to classify packets, police traffic flows, and communicate with each other.
